Privacy regulation and online advertising by Goldfarb, Avi & Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600259
Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising
Avi Goldfarb and Catherine E. Tucker∗
August 5, 2010
Abstract
Advertisers use online customer data to target their marketing appeals. This has
heightened consumers’ privacy concerns, leading governments to pass laws designed
to protect consumer privacy by restricting the use of data and by restricting online
tracking techniques used by websites. We use the responses of 3.3 million survey-takers
who had been randomly exposed to 9,596 online display (banner) advertising campaigns
to explore how privacy regulation in the European Union has influenced advertising
effectiveness. This privacy regulation restricted advertisers’ ability to collect data on
web users in order to target ad campaigns. We find that on average, display advertising
became far less effective at changing stated purchase intent after the EU laws were
enacted, relative to display advertising in other countries. The loss in effectiveness was
more pronounced for websites that had general content (such as news sites), where
non-data-driven targeting is particularly hard to do. The loss of effectiveness was also
more pronounced for ads with a smaller presence on the webpage and for ads that did
not have additional interactive, video, or audio features.
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1 Introduction
Automated collection of the vast stream of electronic data from consumers’ use of the internet
represents an opportunity for marketing modelers to target their marketing campaigns better.
For example, a product campaign can now use data on website browsing behavior to identify
the subset of consumers who are likely to respond to an ad. This large-scale collection of
data has also heightened consumers’ concerns about their privacy. As a result, governments
around the world are considering new privacy regulations designed to restrict the collection
and use of customer data by firms. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is
considering moving to regulate the use of customer data for online ad targeting, rather than
relying on industry self-regulation. However, this government regulation is largely being
passed in an empirical vacuum. So far, there has been no systematic study that evaluates
the effect of such measures on advertisers and media (Lenard and Rubin, 2009).
To fill this empirical vacuum, this paper measures the effects of the enactment of data
privacy laws on how well advertising performs. We find that in Europe, where privacy laws
have been implemented, banner ads have experienced on average a reduction in effectiveness
of 65 percent in terms of changing stated purchase intent. We saw no similar change in ad
effectiveness in non-European countries during a similar time frame. Ads on general interest
websites (such as news sites) and plain banner ads experienced a particularly large reduction
in effectiveness. Ads on specialized websites (such as baby and travel websites), and also
larger and more intrusive ads, experienced far less of a decline. In describing proposed
US regulation, Congressman Rick Boucher, chair of the subcommittee on ‘Communications,
Technology and the Internet’, said that “We do not want to disrupt targeted advertising”
(Corbin, 2010). However, the empirical findings of this paper suggest that even moderate
privacy regulation does reduce the effectiveness of online advertising, that these costs are
not borne equally by all websites, and that the costs should be weighed against the benefits
to consumers.
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To measure how well online advertising performs in different privacy regimes, we use
data from a large-scale database of field studies that randomized advertising exposure. The
database contains 3.3 million survey responses for 9,596 different online display advertising
campaigns conducted on different websites over the course of eight years. The surveys
were conducted by a marketing research company on behalf of advertisers to measure the
effectiveness of each campaign in a way that could be compared consistently over time and
across campaigns and that could also help advertisers allocate advertising budgets. For each
campaign, on average, 347 web users were surveyed. These users were in the target group
to receive the ads. Prior to being surveyed, the research firm set it up so that half of the
respondents randomly saw the ad campaign while the other half did not. Each respondent
was then asked whether they were likely to purchase the product advertised. The relative
increase in purchase intent among the group that was exposed to the ad (the treatment group)
compared to those who did not see the ad (the control group) measures the effectiveness of
the campaign.
We then evaluate how the enactment of the EU ‘Privacy and Electronic Communications
Directive’ (2002/58/EC) (the ‘Privacy Directive’) affected the performance of ad campaigns
in the European countries that enacted it, relative to other countries that had no such laws,
and relative to the performance of ad campaigns in Europe prior to the enactment of the law.
Several provisions in the Privacy Directive limited the ability of advertisers to use and collect
data about customers to target advertising. These limitations are widely seen as stricter than
those in the United States and elsewhere (Baumer et al., 2004). In particular, these provisions
made it more difficult for the advertisers in our data to target their ads to customers who
exhibited behavior relevant to the product advertised. For example, a car manufacturer
may want to show ads only to people whom they know are interested in buying a car. An
attractive way of identifying the target pool for the ad is to use information that a customer
appeared to be trying to find information about new cars elsewhere. However, the Privacy
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Directive limited websites’ ability to use data on consumers’ past browsing behavior in this
way. This could theoretically limit advertisers’ ability to show ads to consumers who were
likely to be influenced by the advertising message. We therefore measure how such changes
in the ability to target influenced the average response to online advertising. Combining
the differences across countries and the differences over time with the differences between
the treatment and control groups yields a difference-in-difference-in-difference econometric
specification.
Our analysis suggests that after the Privacy Directive was passed, advertising effectiveness
decreased on average by around 65 percent in Europe relative to the rest of the world. We
present some rough bounds analysis to suggest that such a change could have a striking
impact on the $8 billion spent each year on digital advertising. To check that it is the
regulation that is associated with the reduction in effectiveness rather than unobserved
changes in European responsiveness towards online advertising, we exploit the fact that
sometimes people browse websites outside their country. We found that when Europeans
browsed websites outside of Europe (mostly in the US) that were not affected by these laws,
there was no reduction in ad effectiveness. Conversely, when non-Europeans browsed EU
websites that were covered by the laws, there was a reduction in ad effectiveness. This
suggests that the change in effectiveness we observe is not linked to time-varying changes in
consumer attitudes in Europe relative to the US.
Websites that had general content unrelated to specific product categories (such as news
and media services) experienced larger decreases in ad effectiveness after the laws passed than
websites that had more specific content (such as travel or parenting websites). Customers
at travel and parenting websites have already identified themselves as being in a particular
target market, so it is less important for those websites to use data on previous browsing
behavior to target their ads. The Privacy Directive also disproportionately affected ads that
did not have additional visual or interactive features. One interpretation is that plain banner
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ads’ effectiveness depends on their ability to be appropriate and interesting to their audience.
Therefore, the laws curtailing the use of past browsing behavior to identify a target audience
for the ads would affect plain banner ads disproportionately. We also find that the Privacy
Directive affected ads that had a small footprint on a webpage more than those with a large
footprint.
Our findings build on a small empirical literature that has documented costs associated
with privacy regulations (Romanosky et al., 2008; Miller and Tucker, 2009).1 It also builds
on previous work which has documented that privacy concerns can influence the effective-
ness of different online advertising techniques (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2010; Tucker, 2010).
Overall, our results suggest that, while there may be many reasons to enact privacy regula-
tion, such regulation may reduce ad effectiveness, particularly for plain banner ads and for
general interest websites. Speculatively, this may change the number and types of businesses
sustained by the advertising-supported internet.
2 Data and Institutional Background
2.1 Laws
We study the effects of the implementation of the Privacy Directive by five EU countries. The
Privacy Directive clarified how the ‘Data Protection Directive’ 95/46/EC (which guaranteed
rights to individuals when it came to the processing of their personal data) pertained to
the electronic communications sector. One of the primary purposes of the Privacy Directive
was to regulate the use of telephones, faxes, and email, but there were also implications for
websites that wished to store and use data about their users for marketing purposes.
The Privacy Directive was implemented on different dates in different member countries.
1The rest of the literature in marketing on the effects of privacy regulation has largely been theoretical. It
has focused on the potential for optimal targeting given customer anticipation of firms’ actions. Much of this
literature has focused on pricing (Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Fudenburg and Villas-Boas, 2006). Hermalin
and Katz (2006) investigate the secrecy aspects of privacy and show that assigning property rights over
information may not be sufficient to achieve allocative efficiency.
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This variation adds to our experimental variation for identification purposes, and we exploit
it in our robustness checks. Table 1 describes the differences in implementation date for each
of the European countries for which we have ad campaign data before and after the change
in regulation.
Table 1: Implementation of Privacy Directive within Europe
Country Implementation
France June 2004 Implemented on 21 June 2004 by the ‘Trust in Computer Processing in the
Economy Act’ and law of 9 July 2004 on electronic communications
Germany June 2004 Directive 2002/58/EC implemented as part of the Telecommunications Act
that became effective in June 2004.
Italy January 2004 The consolidated Data Protection Code (legislative decree no. 196/2003) came
into force on 1 January 2004.
Netherlands May 2004 Directive 2002/58/EC has been transposed into Dutch law, mainly by mod-
ifications introduced in the Telecommunicatiewet (Telecommunications Act),
entering into force on 19 May 2004. Other legislation transposing parts of this
Directive are, amongst others, the Wet op de Economische Delicten (Act on
Economic Offenses) that implements Article 13(4) of Directive 2002/58/EC.
UK December 2003 Directive 2002/58/EC is transposed into UK law as the Privacy and Electronic
Communication Regulations which came into effect on December 11 2003.
Source: Eighth Annual Report of the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection.
Our empirical specifications treat the enactment of these laws as a discontinuous event,
but in reality, in the time since they have been enacted, most EU countries have tightened
enforcement of these provisions, and have clarified them in the context of national laws. For
example, the 2004 German Telecommunications Act’s provisions on privacy were replaced by
the ‘German Telemedia Act’ of 2007. We do not model these clarifications and amendments,
so our estimates should be interpreted as the effect of the change in privacy regime which
facilitated this legal clarification process, rather than purely the effect of these precise laws
as they were initially passed.
2.2 Effect of laws on advertisers
The Privacy Directive strengthened European law. Baumer et al. (2004) (p. 410) emphasize
that the privacy laws that resulted from the Privacy Directive are far stricter than in the
US and that ‘maintaining full compliance with restrictive privacy laws can be costly, par-
ticularly since that adherence can result in a loss of valuable marketing data.’ The Privacy
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Directive affected online ad targeting in three main ways: web bugs, cookies, and collection
of clickstream data.2
2.2.1 Web Bugs
‘Web bugs’ are 1x1-pixel pieces of code that allow advertisers to track customers remotely.3
Web bugs are different from cookies, because they are designed to be invisible to the user
and are not stored on a user’s computer. This means that without inspecting a webpage’s
underlying html code, a customer cannot know they are being tracked. Web bugs allow
advertisers to track customers as they more from one webpage to another. They also allow
advertisers to document how far a website visitor scrolls down a page. Combined, this means
they are very helpful in determining website visitor interests.
Web bugs are widely used on commercial websites. Murray and Cowart (2001) found
that 96 percent of websites that mentioned a top 50 brand (as determined by the 2000
FT rankings) had a web bug. Online privacy advocates such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation voiced early objections to marketers’ use of web bugs because of this intentional
invisibility (Smith, 1999). Recital 24 of the Privacy Directive explicitly says that ‘So-called
spyware, web bugs, hidden identifiers and other similar devices can enter the user’s terminal
without their knowledge in order to gain access to information, to store hidden information
or to trace the activities of the user and may seriously intrude upon the privacy of these users.
The use of such devices should be allowed only for legitimate purposes, with the knowledge
of the users concerned.’ This ‘knowledge’ restriction matters because the need to ensure
that users are informed about the use of web bugs removes one of their major advantages,
which is that they are otherwise invisible to the user. If regulation curtails advertisers’ use
of web bugs, advertisers become less able to use data on current and past browsing behavior
to target their advertising.
2We provide the sections of the Privacy Directive pertaining to online advertising in the online appendix.
3These are also called ‘beacons’, ‘action tags’, ‘clear GIFs’, ‘Web tags’, or ‘pixel tags’ (Gilbert, 2008)
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The law suggests that ‘(17) For the purposes of this Directive, consent of a user or
subscriber, regardless of whether the latter is a natural or a legal person, should have the
same meaning as the data subject’s consent as defined and further specified in Directive
95/46/EC. Consent may be given by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific
and informed indication of the user’s wishes, including by ticking a box when visiting an
Internet website.’ The costs involved in obtaining such such user consent are large. For
example, in confidential discussions, executives at two large European companies suggested
that explicitly obtaining user consent to be tracked online costs around 15 euros per user in
administrative costs and promotional incentives. There is some ambiguity, however, about
whether ‘knowledge’ directly implies opt-in consent. Some authors, like Gilbert (2008),
suggest that the law implies that web bugs should be treated like cookies, meaning that
opt-out consent is enough.
2.2.2 Cookies
According to Recital 25 of the Privacy Directive, cookies can be a ‘legitimate and useful
tool,’ and their use should be allowed on the condition that users are provided with ‘clear
and precise information in accordance with the Data Protection Directive about the purposes
of cookies.’4 For U.S.-based websites, notice of the installation of cookies, if it takes place
at all, takes place in website privacy policies. The EU law we study is therefore more
restrictive on the placement of cookies than US law, and makes it easier for customers to
become aware that cookies are being used and to reject them. As discussed by Debussere
(2005), the wording of the directive does suggest that the requirements apply to any cookie,
rather than cookies used to store personally identifiable information. In general, the tone
taken in the Privacy Directive towards cookies is more favorable than that taken towards
web bugs, perhaps because cookies can be controlled and are visible to the user. However,
4On October 26 2009, after the period we study, the EU voted to require internet users’ opt-in consent
before cookies could be placed on their machines.
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cookies pose problems to marketers because of customer deletion,5 so web bugs (which a user
cannot avoid) have been increasingly used in conjunction with, or even in place of, cookies
in targeting of advertising (Reiley and Lewis, 2009). Web bugs also have greater reach in
terms of tracking ability than cookies because they can be used to track consumer scrolling
within a webpage.
2.2.3 Clickstream Data
‘Clickstream data’ describes data that records the webpages a user viewed at a website, how
long the user spent on each webpage, the visitor’s path through the site (including her points
of entry and exit), the visitor’s IP address, and the webpage the user viewed immediately
before arriving at the website. As pointed out by Wong and Garrie (2006), the Privacy
Directive never deals explicitly with restrictions on the use of clickstream data except to say
that sites are permitted to retain traffic data that is necessary for websites to provide their
service or user-requested ‘information society services’.
However, more recently, legal scholars and privacy experts have pointed out that the
presumption that such clickstream data is never personally identifiable is not correct. First,
there has been a growth of static IP addresses which can directly identify a user, especially if
the network administrator uses identifiers connected with physical location or name. Static
IP addresses are increasingly used in large firms, government, and educational institutions.
In a recent court case in Germany described by Jakobs (2009), Google has been criticized
for not obtaining their users’ consent prior to websites analyzing their behavior with Google
Analytics. Second, it may be possible to collect data inadvertently which is considered
private under the scope of the Data Protection Directive if it relates to religion, union member
status, or medical issues (Clayton, 2008). This distinction between whether clickstream data
is personal or anonymous is crucial because of the different provisions regarding consent.
Anonymous data can be collected if the user is informed and then given the ability to opt
538.4 percent of surveyed web users said they deleted cookies each month (Moran, 2003)
9
out, but personal data requires a clear ‘opt-in’ form of consent (Baumer et al., 2004). The
lack of clarity in whether or how the Privacy Directive applies to clickstream data therefore
adds another challenge to online ad targeting beyond web bugs and cookies.
2.2.4 Ambiguities in Interpretation
Given that there are multiple ambiguities in interpreting the laws, firm and advertiser re-
sponse has been mixed. Some firms have been conservative in their interpretation, and have
limited their collection and use of data for targeting if they have not received prior consent.
Some EU lawyers have even recommended that firms do not store IP addresses unless consent
is obtained.6
Other firms have interpreted the regulations less strictly. For example, an attorney
at a large provider of information society services and advertising contacted the authors
anonymously to argue that opt-in consent was not required - “where ‘consent’ is required
under the ePrivacy directive, this consent doesn’t have to be opt-in consent, unless this is
specifically requested, e.g. as ‘explicit consent’ or ‘prior consent.’ [...] [A]s long as they
provide information [about how users’ data is used] and browsers provide an opt-out [for
cookies], they comply with the law.”
Given the controversies over how to interpret the EU Directives in the light of techno-
logical change, we emphasize that our estimates show the effects of firms’ and advertisers’
interpretations of the EU Directives, not the effects of the laws’ actual texts unmediated by
interpretation.
2.3 Advertising Data
We use data on 9,596 different field studies of online ad campaigns worldwide from 2001-
2008. We define a ‘campaign’ as a separate ad campaign created for a specific product on a
specific website. This database contains over three million survey responses collected by a
6‘European Data Protection, German Data protection, Web 2.0 & Law’ - Dr. Carsten Ulbricht, Monday
November 2009, http://germany-weblaw.grpublic.de
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media metrics agency to measure the effectiveness of these ad campaigns.
Each of these field studies were conducted by a firm to assess the relative performance of
an existing campaign. After the field study data were collected by the media metrics agency,
firms could access the data through a ‘marketing dashboard’ that allowed them to judge the
performance of their portfolio of ads across different websites and different designs. This
information was then used to help guide future banner ad design and placement. The focus
on evaluation of existing campaigns means that our data contain fully-fledged campaigns
typically run on the web with attendant targeting ambitions. We cannot rule out selection
effects entirely, but we present evidence below that suggests that ad campaign characteristics
do not change significantly in the EU relative to outside the EU after the regulation takes
effect.
Each field study lasted a mean of 55 days (median 49 days). The campaigns that were
evaluated in the field studies advertised over 400 different kinds of products on 40 different
categories of websites over 8 years. This means that our data should be thought of as a
repeated cross-section. There are 10 different countries in our data. Of these, we have 894
campaigns for Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom within the
EU and 8,792 for the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Mexico outside the EU.
Because the measurement firm’s clientele grew over time, 81 percent of our data comes from
after the EU regulation came into effect.
These field studies are based on randomly displaying ads to a subset of the group of web
users who are in the target group for the ad. The browsers in the target group who did not see
the ad saw a placebo ad, typically for a non-profit. Both exposed and not exposed (control)
respondents were recruited via an online survey invitation that usually appeared in a pop-up
window. They then completed the survey online in this pop-up window immediately upon
positively responding to the invitation. The survey usually took less than 10 minutes to
complete.
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Each campaign had an average of 347 people in its subject pool, of whom half were
exposed to the ad for the product. Because advertising was randomized conditional on being
in the target group, both exposed and control groups should have had the same underlying
purchase intent. The only difference between the two groups is whether they saw the ad, so
differences in survey responses for the exposed group can be attributed to the content and
selection of audience for the online campaign.
This online questionnaire asked the extent to which a respondent was likely to purchase a
variety of products (including the one studied) on a five-point scale. In the main specifications
in this paper, we focus attention on whether the respondent reported they were “Very Likely”
or “Likely to Make a Purchase.”As reported in our summary statistics in Table 2, over one-
third of respondents said they were Likely or Very Likely to purchase. We convert the scale
in this manner to reflect the fact that on an ordinal scale, the perceived distance between 1
and 2 may be different than the perceived distance between 3 and 4 (Malhotra (2007); Aaker
et al. (2004)). However, we recognize that there is no consensus about whether such scales
should be used as discrete measures or used as a continuous measure (Fink, 2009), so we
replicate our main result using a linear regression with the full scale as a dependent measure.
The use of stated purchase intent as a measure of ad effectiveness differs from the majority
of the marketing literature such as Manchanda et al. (2006) and Chatterjee et al. (2003),
which has focused on measuring the effect of ad exposure on click-through rates. There are
arguments in favor of either measure: Clicking on an ad does represent a measurable action
on the part of the consumer, but it may indicate mere curiosity. In contrast, purchase intent
implies an intention to act on something of key interest to firms, but only an expressed
intention.
In other robustness checks, we use two additional dependent variables: The respondent’s
favorability toward the product and whether the respondent recalled seeing the advertise-
ment. Respondents rated on a five-point scale their favorability toward the product (as well
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as toward some decoy products). We use whether a respondent felt ‘favorable’ or ‘very favor-
able’ towards the product as our dependent measure. For recall, the surveys displayed the
ad, alongside some decoy ads for other products, and the respondents were asked whether
they recalled seeing any of these ads. Overall, we focus on the purchase intent measure
because it is closest to the metric that advertisers care about: whether a customer will pur-
chase. Ad recall and brand favorability (and also clickthrough rates) are further away from
purchase in the hierarchy of persuasion discussed in the advertising literature (Ehrenberg,
1974; Vakratsas and Ambler., 1999).
If they responded that they had seen the focal ad, then we code this variable as one and
as zero otherwise. As can be seen in Table 2, recall is relatively low at 26 percent, much in
line with Dreze and Hussherr (2003)’s eye-tracker research that suggests that internet users
avoid looking at banner ads during their online activities.
An important strength of this data set is that it allows comparison of campaigns across
many countries over eight years in a variety of categories, including apparel, automotive,
consumer packaged goods, energy, entertainment, financial services, home improvement, re-
tail, technology, telecommunications, travel, and many others. These measures are, however,
weaker measures of ad success than purchasing (as used by Reiley and Lewis (2009)) because
users may claim that they intend to purchase but never do so. However, the direction of
our core results depends only on these measures being positively correlated with purchase
outcomes, a correlation demonstrated by Bemmaor (1995), because we ultimately focus on
comparative ad effectiveness. The very privacy laws that we study also mean it is problem-
atic to track customers’ subsequent purchase decisions in a manner similar to Reiley and
Lewis (2009), who combine web bugs and link online and oﬄine data. The Privacy Directive
would require the Yahoo! users that these authors study to give their opt-in consent because
the data become identifiable when combined with an oﬄine identity.
The survey also asked about respondent income, age, and the number of hours spent
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations
Purchase Intent 0.37 0.48 0 1 3329632
Favorable Opinion 0.42 0.49 0 1 3180804
Ad Recall 0.26 0.44 0 1 3035292
Intent Scale 2.93 1.47 1 5 3329632
Opinion Scale 3.48 1.08 1 6 3180804
Exposed 0.56 0.50 0 1 3329632
EU 0.081 0.27 0 1 3329632
After EU Law (All Countries) 0.81 0.39 0 1 3329632
Female 0.54 0.50 0 1 3329632
Income ($) 64912.4 56342.7 15000 250000 2551263
Age 42.2 15.5 10 100 3283997
Weekly Internet Hours 13.9 10.3 1 31 2606978
on the internet. We converted these to zero-mean standardized measures and used them
as controls in our regressions. The non-standardized values are reported in our summary
statistics in Table 2. The number of observations for each demographic variable makes clear
that there are some missing values. We normalize these to zero.
We use two other types of data. First, we use campaign-specific information that de-
scribed the physical size of the ad and the multimedia features it had. Second, for the
purpose of establishing the legal regime, we identify the country from information on where
the survey was based. This identifies the relevant legal regime because the presence of a
server or other such physical presence generally establishes country of jurisdiction when it
comes to internet law.7
2.4 Effect of Privacy Regulation on Campaign Ad Effectiveness
The Privacy Directive restricts the ability of the advertisers in our data to identify a group of
consumers for targeting. Because the marketing research company randomizes ad assignment
7Debussere (2005) notes that under one interpretation of the ruling, the restrictions could conceivably
apply to non-EU organizations who collect data on EU persons. However, conversations with companies
based in the US have made it clear that they do not modified their tracking technologies when customers
from the EU visit their website.
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Table 3: Differences in Differences: Within Europe
Mean Control Mean Exposed Difference T-Test
Before Privacy Law 0.377 0.407 -0.030 -6.994
After Privacy Law 0.375 0.377 -0.002 -1.188
conditional in being in the targeted group, this means that the Privacy Directive alters the
composition of the subject pool (both in the treatment and control groups) and, by extension,
how targeted the subject pool can be in our field data. This occurs without affecting the
randomization that is crucial to our identification of the effect of online advertising. While
we do not know which targeting technologies were used in each campaign, we do know that
these are large advertisers on the leading edge of technology and it is therefore likely that
they would use the best legal techniques available, including web bugs and cookies.
Table 3 displays the raw difference-in-difference for ad campaigns in European countries
before and after their laws were enacted. It indicates two things. First, that after the law was
enacted, purchase intent was slightly lower for both the exposed and control group. This is
to be expected if it is now harder for advertisers to identify an appropriate target group (and
consequently an appropriate subject pool). Second, that there was little difference between
the exposed and the control groups after the law was enacted. This suggests that advertisers
became less able to identify a subject pool where someone who was exposed to the ad would
be influenced by the ad.
Table 4 replicates this result for the rest of the world using the median date of enactment
among the countries in our survey as the date for the placebo privacy law. It does not
appear that there was a comparable decrease in the effectiveness of ad exposure at changing
purchase intent outside of Europe.
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Table 4: Differences in Differences: Outside of Europe
Mean Control Mean Exposed Difference T-Test
Before European Privacy Law 0.346 0.362 -0.016 -11.766
After European Privacy Law 0.368 0.386 -0.017 -27.988
3 Estimation and Results
3.1 Main specification
Next, we use econometric analysis to formalize the insights of Tables 3 and 4. First, we focus
on European campaigns only. We use a straightforward specification that reflects both the
variation in time to implementation and the randomized nature of exposure to advertising
in our data. As such, we start with a difference-in-difference using only the EU data; below,
we will add the third difference between the European countries and the other countries. For
person i who was exposed to advertising campaign j in country c in year t, we estimate the
following specification:
Intentijct = αExposureij + βExposureij × Lawct + θXi + γjct + ijct (1)
α measures the effect of being exposed to an advertisement. β captures the core relation-
ship in this paper - the incremental change in advertising effectiveness when a privacy law
is in place. Xi is a vector of demographic controls including gender, age, income, and hours
online. γjct is a fixed effect which captures differences in baseline purchase intent for each
campaign in each website in each country (and since each campaign runs for a short period
therefore controls for the main effect of PrivacyLawct); ijct is the error term.
Our estimation procedure is straightforward because of the randomized nature of the data
collection. We have an experiment-like setting, with a treatment group who were exposed
16
to the ads and a control group who were not. We compare these groups’ purchase intent,
and explore whether the difference between the exposed and control groups is related to
the implementation of the Privacy Directive into various European countries. Identification
is based on the assumption that coinciding with the enactment of privacy laws, there was
no systematic change in advertising effectiveness independent of the law (an assumption
we explore below). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the website-
campaign level, to adjust for intra-website and intra-campaign correlation across respondents.
We report our main results using a linear probability model, though we also show ro-
bustness to a logit formulation. This robustness is in line with the findings of Angrist and
Pischke (2009) that there is typically little qualitative difference between the logit and linear
probability specifications. We focus on the linear probability model because it enables us
to estimate a model with 9,596 campaign fixed effects using the full data set of 3.3 million
observations (the linear functional form means that we can partial out these fixed effects
through mean-centering), whereas computational limitations prevent us from estimating a
logit model with this full set of fixed effects. Likely because our covariates are mostly binary
and the mass point of the dependent variable is far from 0 or 1, the predicted probabilities
all lie between 0 and 1. This means that the potential bias of the linear probability model
if predicted values lie outside of the range of 0 and 1 (Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006) is not an
issue in our estimation.
Table 5 shows our main results, building up to the full specification for equation (1) in
column (4). Columns (1) and (2) show general trends in the data without campaign fixed
effects. Column (1) confirms that there is a positive relationship between ad exposure and
purchase intent. Column (2) replicates the results in Table 3 using the regression format,
showing that purchase intent is lower in places with privacy laws and that advertising expo-
sure has little relation to intent in places with privacy laws. Column (3) adds demographic
controls that capture differences in the demographic composition of those exposed and not
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exposed to ads. Little changes, as expected given the randomization of ads.
Column (4) adds campaign-level fixed effects (that is, a fixed effect for every product-
website combination). These fixed effects, combined with the random assignment of the ads,
control for four distinct influences on purchase intent. First, heterogeneity across people
who browse websites. Second, heterogeneity in people who are targeted for ads for different
products. Third, heterogeneity across countries, because each campaign is launched in only
one country. Fourth, heterogeneity across time, because these campaigns run on average for
7 weeks. These fixed effects are collinear with the privacy law variable.8 The privacy variable
consequently drops out of the fixed effect specifications. Column (4) reports the change in
results for the EU when we add these fixed effects. The estimates suggest that the law is
associated with a decrease in effectiveness of on average 65% of the initial exposure effect.9
The identifying assumption for Columns (1)-(4) is that there was no other change in ad
effectiveness after 2004 that was not related to the privacy law. However, it could be that
generally (perhaps because of customer fatigue or growing inertia) online ads were simply
becoming less effective. To rule out this explanation, we compare the change in Europe to
the rest of the world as follows:
Intentijct = αExposureij + β1Exposureij × AfterEULawct × EUc + (2)
β2Exposureij ×BeforeEULawct + β3Exposureij ×NotEUc +
θXij + γjct + ijct
This equation combines the insights of Tables 3 and 4 into a single specification, using
a ‘differences in differences in differences’ approach. We use ad effectiveness in the other
countries in our data to control for changes over time (pre-law and post-law) in the effects
8There is only one campaign in the data that spanned the enactment of the law, with just 30 people
caught in this gap.
9The R2 falls from column 3 to 4 because the fixed effects are differenced out rather than estimated.
18
of ad exposure with the coefficient β2. We also allow for differences in the baseline effect of
ad exposure between Europe and the rest of the world with the coefficient β3. We again use
the median effective date of the EU Law as the date of the law for countries where there was
no law. Subsequently, we check for robustness to alternative definitions.10
Column (5) of Table 5 reports the results for this three-way differencing approach that
uses the non-EU countries in the data to control for a general time-trend in the effectiveness
of online advertising exposure. The key coefficient of interest, Exposureij×AfterEULawct×
EUc, is negative and significant and similar in magnitude to before. It suggests that after the
policy change, ads in the EU lost nearly two-thirds of their effectiveness in terms of purchase
intent. The coefficients for Exposureij×BeforeLawinEUct are insignificant, suggesting that
in this time period there has been no systematic change in ad effectiveness over time outside
of Europe. The coefficient in Exposureij ×NotinEUc is also not significant, suggesting that
there was not much initial difference between the EU and the non-EU countries.
One thing to note is that across all specifications the measured main effects of exposure
are relatively small, in the 2.5 percentage point range. This makes sense given the low
relative price of each banner ad impression of 0.02 cents (Adify, 2009). Generally, banner
advertising should be viewed as an advertising mechanism where advertising effectiveness is
relatively low, but where as a result equilibrium prices are relatively low too.
10We define the controls as NotEUc and BeforeEULawct rather than as EUc and AfterEULawct in
order to facilitate interpretation. Specifically, it allows a direct comparison of the size of Exposureij (0.0263)
and Exposureij ×AfterEULawct × EUc (-0.0171) because Exposureij captures the effectiveness of online
advertising in the EU in the absence of the regulation. With the standard definition of the controls, the
reader must add together the lower-order interactions to get the proper basis of comparison. We report
results of the more standard controls in the online appendix, and show that the estimate of Exposureij ×
AfterEULawct × EUc is identical, and (as expected) the baseline effect of Exposureij is lower, because
Exposureij ×AfterEULawct and Exposureij × EUt now need to be added to it.
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Table 5: Advertising exposure is less effective in the EU after regulation
EU Data only All Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ad exposure only No controls Demographic controls Campaign fixed effects Three-way difference
Exposed × After EU Law × EU -0.0275∗∗∗ -0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗ -0.0171∗∗
(0.00474) (0.00472) (0.00694) (0.00714)
Exposed 0.00746∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗
(0.00187) (0.00426) (0.00424) (0.00641) (0.00635)
After EU Law × EU -0.00221 0.0129∗∗∗
(0.00340) (0.00341)
Female 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.00190) (0.00381) (0.00149)
Std. Internet Hours 0.00274∗∗ 0.00936∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00116) (0.00125) (0.000341)
Std. Income -0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.00288∗∗∗
(0.00143) (0.00224) (0.000480)
Std. Age -0.0378∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗
(0.00101) (0.00390) (0.000683)
Constant 0.375∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00304) (0.00320)
Exposed × After EU Law -0.00109
(0.00194)
Exposed × Not-EU -0.00979
(0.00658)
Campaign Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 271207 271207 271207 271207 3329632
R-Squared 0.379 0.379 0.385 0.160 0.172
Columns (1)-(4) use data from EU only. Column (5) uses data from the EU and rest of the world. Dependent variable is purchase intent. Robust
standard errors clustered at the website-campaign level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01 AfterEULaw × EU is collinear with the campaign
fixed effects and is therefore excluded from Column (4). BeforeEULaw × notEU , notEU , and BeforeEULaw are collinear with the campaign
fixed effects and are therefore excluded from Column (5)
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3.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of these results in two ways. First, we perform a wide range of tests
aimed at reducing concerns related to functional form and specification. In section 3.3 we
discuss lingering selection concerns related to our fundamental identifying assumption that
the European campaigns and the European respondents do not systematically change over
time for reasons other than the regulations.
Table 6 checks the robustness to alternative specifications. Column (1) shows the robust-
ness of the specification in column (5) of Table 5 to a logit regression. Due to computational
limitations we are not able to estimate the full set of 9,596 fixed effects, but instead in-
clude the full set of lower-order interactions. In a logit specification the interpretation of
interactions is not straightforward, as they are a cross-derivative of the expected value of
the dependent variable. The sign of this marginal effect is not necessarily the same as the
sign of the coefficient of an interaction term. Therefore we also verified that the marginal
effects and logit coefficients are similar in sign and significance using the method suggested
by Ai and Norton (2003). The results are consistent with the main specification. The main
interaction term capturing the effect of the law is negative and significant.
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Columns (2)-(4) of Table 6 show robustness to different potential measures of ad effec-
tiveness. Column (2) replicates column (5) of Table 5, where the dependent variable is the
full intent scale, and we again use a linear regression with fixed effects. The qualitative
results do not change. Column (3) shows a similar negative interaction effect between the
law and exposure for favorable opinion. Column (4) shows a smaller negative effect relative
to the main effect for ad recall. Contrasting the effect of the regulation on ad recall to the
effect of the regulation on stated purchase intent suggests that the laws made it harder to
identify customers who could be persuaded to change their purchase intent, more than it
made it harder to identify customers who could recall the ads.
One issue with the survey methodology is that once someone was exposed to the ad, they
could be re-exposed to it if they refreshed the page or returned to it later. Column (5) shows
that our results are robust if we focus our attention only on people who saw the ad once.
Column (6) of Table 6 shows that our results are robust if we put in a variety of controls
for the interactions with exposure for the timing of each country’s law (as can be seen in Table
1) rather than merely capturing the before and after period with a single interaction. These
controls are largely insignificant or, where they are marginally significant, the signs do not
show a consistent pattern. Column (7) checks that our results are robust to the exclusion of
the lower per-capita income countries Mexico and Brazil where change may have been more
fast-paced. Column (8) shows robustness to fixed effects for each respondent’s country in
order to control for respondent origin as distinct from website origin.
One concern with any study of regulation is that the dates of enactment might not give a
precise measurement of the law’s effect because advertisers anticipate the laws. In the online
appendix, we show the robustness of our main results in column (5) of Table 5 to using
slightly different timing assumptions about when the law started influencing the behavior
of advertiser. Our results remain robust whether or not we used the date the regulation
was first scheduled, the implementation deadline or the date the law passed, all of which
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are alternative dates which advertisers may use as the date they changed their targeting
practices.
3.3 Unobservables
Table 6 documented robustness to several alternative data and modeling decisions. In this
section, we examine the likelihood that there is an unobserved change in measured advertising
effectiveness in Europe relative to the rest of the world that is not related to the Privacy
Directive. Specifically, we examine three such issues: (1) the campaigns we may observe are
non-random, (2) the respondents might not represent the general internet population, and
(3) there may have been a change in European consumer attitudes and responsiveness to
online advertising separate from the Privacy Directive.
In order to address the first issue, we checked to see whether the observable nature of
campaigns changed in Europe relative to the US as a result of the change in the regulation. In
particular, while the respondents were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups, the
campaigns in the data were not randomly chosen. It might be troubling if there were evidence
that European ad agencies invested less in their ad creatives relative to the US (though this
is only a concern for our interpretation of the results if this underinvestment was not due to
the regulations). We document in the online appendix that there is no significant difference
in the proportion of ads using different ‘ad improvements,’ like interactive features such as
‘floating over the webpage’, video, or a large ad footprint, in the EU and the rest of the world
before and after the laws. This does not completely overcome concerns about selection, but
it suggests that there was little difference before and after relative between the US and EU
in terms of the expense of creative formats used. Nevertheless, while it is comforting that
there is little change in observable characteristics and that this is the main data source in
the industry, there is still the possibility that the ads changed in some characteristic that we
do not observe.
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The second issue relates to the possibility that respondents might not represent the
general internet population. The company does not make data available about response
rates to the survey, but response rates are likely to be low. However, given the experimental
nature of our data and that the surveys are explicitly opt-in (and therefore the response
rate is unaffected by the implementation of the law), the response rates should not affect
our qualitative measures of advertising effectiveness, though it is possible that they might
affect the magnitude. For example, these are people who (by design) responded to an ad
and therefore might be more ad-sensitive overall.
In order to address this concern, we note that the demographic profile of the respondents
appears to be representative of the general population of internet users in terms of average
income, age, and time spent online (DiMaggio and Bonikowski, 2008), though with a slightly
larger proportion of women. The cost-effectiveness calculations also look right in the sense
that in Goldfarb and Tucker (2010) with similar data we show that the small effects of the
ads are consistent with the low prices for such ads. In addition, it is these very survey data
that advertisers use when evaluating where to allocate advertising dollars. Therefore, if we
are interested in the potential effects of the laws on advertising purchase decisions, then these
data are likely to be the best guide to actual advertising decisions. Still, we acknowledge
that selection issues may still bias the magnitude of the effects we observe and that it is not
clear which direction the bias would take.
The third concern about unobservables is whether there are alternative explanations
for the measured changes in the attitudes of survey participants towards online advertising
that were separate but contemporaneous with the change in European privacy laws. For
example, our results could also be explained if Europeans became more cynical about online
advertising relative to the rest of the world after the Privacy Directive became effective.
To check for such unobserved heterogeneity, we perform a falsification test. We look at
the behavior of Europeans on non-European websites that are not covered by the European
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Privacy Directive to see if we observe a similar shift in behavior. If the alternate explanation
we just described is true, Europeans should also be less influenced by ads on US websites.
However, if it is the law that is causing the shift in ad effectiveness at the website level, we
should see no such effect for these websites not covered by European law.11
Table 7 reports the results of this specification. It shows that Europeans on the non-
European websites have similar ad-effectiveness patterns to non-Europeans in Table 4, as
opposed to the pattern they displayed on European websites in Table 3, as ads appear to be
getting more effective rather than less effective over time. This suggests that the changes in
behavior are connected with the websites covered by the law, rather than with the people
taking the survey. We verified that there was no significant difference in the age, gender, or
income of the Europeans who were visiting non-European sites compared to the Europeans
who were visiting European sites before and after the implementation of the directive.
Table 7: EU Survey Takers on non-EU Websites
Mean Control Mean Exposed Difference T-Test
Before European Privacy Law 0.338 0.356 -0.018 -4.392
After European Privacy Law 0.363 0.393 -0.030 -19.372
Table 8: Non-EU Survey Takers on EU Websites
Mean Control Mean Exposed Difference T-Test
Before European Privacy Law 0.337 0.369 -0.032 -2.942
After European Privacy Law 0.318 0.312 0.006 0.458
We also conducted the mirror image of the falsification test by looking at residents of
non-EU countries who visited EU websites. Again, if it is unobserved heterogeneity attached
11The websites that we study did engage in geographical targeting.
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to EU residents that explains our results, we would expect that these external visitors to EU
websites would not display diminished susceptibility to ads.
If, however, the privacy law and the reduced ability to target ads to a specific group
of consumers explain the result, then we would expect a reduction in ad effectiveness with
respect to these users. Table 8 displays the results and shows that ads shown to non-EU
users of EU websites did have a similar reduction in ad effectiveness to those shown to
EU residents. This suggests again that the change in behavior associated with EU privacy
law occurred at the website level, rather than potentially being explained by unobserved
heterogeneity for European residents.
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that there is an unobserved
factor affecting campaign and website characteristics in the EU relative to the rest of the
world. While we believe the above analysis points to a causal relationship, it is possible that
our measures of campaign effectiveness on European websites were systematically falling over
time for reasons other than the regulation.
3.4 Economic Implications
Section 3.2 establishes that our results are statistically robust to many different specifications
and also provides evidence supporting our interpretation of the effect as causal. However, we
have yet not established that the impact of laws is economically meaningful. The point esti-
mates in column (5) of Table 5 suggest that the laws reduced the effectiveness of advertising
by over 65%, but it is 65% of a relatively small number. In this section, we provide some
rough ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations to estimate the regulations’ impact on advertisers’
bottom line. The main purpose of this analysis is to provide suggestive evidence on the
importance of our results. We want to emphasize that the numbers in this section are not
due to equilibrium analysis which would require different data (e.g. prices of the online ads
and substitutable oﬄine ads). Therefore the values should be taken as suggestive of the
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importance of the phenomenon rather than as exact measures of costs.
Column (5) of Table 5 suggests that seeing one plain banner ad increases purchase intent
by 2.63 percentage points. The introduction of privacy laws in the EU was associated with
a decrease in this effectiveness of 1.71 percentage points, or around 65 percent. Therefore,
for an advertiser to achieve the same lift in likely intent as they did prior to the law, they
would have to buy 2.85 times as much advertising.
Currently in the US, $8 billion is spent per year on the type of display-related advertising
that we study (IAB, 2010). If prices and demand of advertising did not change, that would
mean that advertisers would have to spend $14.8 billion more than they are currently doing
to achieve the same increase in purchase intent after the introduction of privacy regulation.
Of course, another possibility is that advertisers might reduce expenditure in line with
this decrease in effectiveness. The nature of our data emphasizes that this could happen,
because we are studying ‘ad-effectiveness’ measures that are specifically designed and used
by advertisers to determine relative allocation of ad budgets across different types of ad-
vertising media. If this occurs, then our estimates suggest that at the extreme, revenue for
online display advertising could fall from $8 billion to $2.8 billion. Furthermore, if the effects
documented here apply more broadly to the advertising-supported internet, this could po-
tentially have implications for the wider economy. Deighton and Quelch (2009) suggest that
the advertising-supported internet represents 2.1% of the total U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) and directly employs more than 1.2 million Americans.
These possibilities are non-equilibrium proxies of potential outcomes from privacy reg-
ulation suggested by the estimates in this study. As discussed in Athey and Gans (2010)
and Bergemann and Bonatti (2010), the extent to which advertisers end up paying more or
websites receive less advertising revenue will be mediated by the extent to which advertisers
view other media as substitutes for the privacy-restricted banner ad. Therefore these large
numbers should be considered to be ‘worst-case’ scenarios. If there are general equilibrium
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shifts in both advertiser and media behavior, the results are likely to be less pronounced.
A final point of caution about these estimates is that they are predicated on the idea
that our data on surveyed purchase intent corresponds to measures of banner ad effectiveness
that drive advertisers’ purchase decisions. For the advertisers we study, this was their major
way of evaluating the relative effectiveness of their display advertising campaigns and con-
sequently allocating advertising budgets. However, there may well be other methodologies
that advertisers use (such as click-through rates).
3.5 Asymmetric effects of regulation
In this section, we explore whether the regulations had asymmetric effects across websites
and across ads. This matters because privacy regulation may shape the future development
of the internet if the regulation affects some websites and ads more than others.
One potential asymmetry is across the breadth of content provided by a website. For ex-
ample, the use of web bugs and cookies is more important for websites that aim for a general
or mainstream audience that is not connected with a specific type of product. Someone visit-
ing www.cruise.com is more likely to be interested in purchasing cruises and can be targeted
accordingly, but a portal or a news website cannot be sure whether someone visiting its main
page is in the market for cruises unless they track whether that consumer is also reading
news features on cruises. This means that general or less product-specific websites could find
consumer tracking technologies relatively more useful for targeting ads than product-specific
websites. This reliance on tracking technologies for targeting advertising by general content
websites is supported by external empirical evidence. For example, the E-Soft annual survey
(Reinke, 2007) documents that the 100 websites that use the most web bugs have consis-
tently been general interest websites, like Information.com, photobucket.com, flickr.com, and
YouTube, as well as various ad networks.
Table 9 stratifies our data by website type and ad type. Column (1) compares the
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Table 9: Comparison of different types of sites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Content Specific Content Media Rich Ads Plain Banners Large Format Ads Small Format Ads
Exposed × After EU Law × EU -0.0589∗∗∗ -0.0906 -0.0148 -0.0184∗∗ 0.00109 -0.0235∗∗
(0.0195) (0.00772) (0.0159) (0.00771) (0.0113) (0.0105)
Exposed 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.00697) (0.0146) (0.00682) (0.00871) (0.00973)
Female 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(0.00226) (0.00192) (0.00207) (0.00191) (0.00492) (0.00137)
Std. Internet Hours 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗
(0.000564) (0.000426) (0.000574) (0.000412) (0.00106) (0.000358)
Std. Income -0.00152∗ -0.00347∗∗∗ -0.00258∗∗∗ -0.00304∗∗∗ -0.000776 -0.00331∗∗∗
(0.000887) (0.000570) (0.000821) (0.000571) (0.00118) (0.000516)
Std. Age -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗
(0.00110) (0.000864) (0.00129) (0.000772) (0.00155) (0.000748)
Exposed × Before EU Law 0.000524 0.00117 0.000342 -0.00197 -0.00292 -0.00227
(0.00421) (0.00221) (0.00338) (0.00242) (0.00366) (0.00278)
Exposed × Not-EU -0.0414∗∗ -0.00683 -0.0144 -0.00775 -0.00703 -0.0142
(0.0190) (0.00690) (0.0150) (0.00714) (0.00907) (0.0101)
Campaign-Site Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1037597 2292035 1098047 2231585 613804 2715828
R-Squared 0.183 0.166 0.163 0.178 0.156 0.176
Robust standard errors clustered at the website-campaign level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 ,*** p < 0.01
BeforeEULaw × notEU , notEU , and BeforeEULaw are collinear with the campaign fixed effects and are therefore excluded
most general content (news, political news, business news, education magazines, regional
news, web services, streaming music, and games and contests) with all other websites (auto,
parenting, men, women, entertainment, shopping, health, cookery, special-interest groups,
house and garden, fashion and style, apparel, beauty and makeup, and travel) in column (2).
These general content websites have a larger negative effect from the law being enacted on ad
effectiveness. This supports Evans (2009), who suggests that two-sided media platforms that
rely on content to bring together disparate groups of advertisers and users have a greater
need to use customer data for targeting.
Another potential way that the law could have asymmetric effects is across ad type. As
discussed by Goldfarb and Tucker (2010), there is a negative relationship between contextual
targeting (or matching a website’s content with a product) and the optimal level of ad
obtrusiveness. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 9 compare the effects of the laws on different ad
types. We distinguish between ads that had visual, interactive, or audio features and ads that
had no multi-media capacity. Columns (3) and (4) compare the results. The negative effect
associated with enactment of laws is significant only for ads that did not have multimedia
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features. We should note, though, that the difference is not significant because of the lack of
precision of the estimate for in column (3). In columns (5) and (6) we check to see whether
the effect of regulation varied by ad size. We compared ads that on one dimension were larger
than a half page format. The results suggest that these large ads experienced a lower negative
effect from the introduction of the laws than ads that were smaller. The apparent difference
in magnitude between larger, more obtrusive ads and other ads may be because obtrusive ads
can still be effective without targeting, as they grab viewers’ attention. However, without
such attention-grabbing features, plain banner ads’ effectiveness depends on their ability to
be appropriate and interesting to the audience. Therefore, the laws’ curtailment of the use
of browsing and scrolling behavior to identify a target audience for the ads affected plain
banner ads disproportionately.
4 Conclusions and Implications
We investigate how privacy regulation influences online advertising effectiveness. We use
data from a large database of field studies that randomly exposed website users to banner
ads. We find that in Europe, where privacy laws have been implemented, banner ads have
experienced a reduction in effectiveness of 65 percent on average in terms of changing stated
purchase intent. We observe no similar change in ad effectiveness in non-European countries
over the same time frame. This provides empirical evidence that privacy regulation can
reduce the effectiveness of advertising.
Furthermore, we show that the loss in effectiveness has been particularly pronounced for
websites with more general content that could not be easily linked with a specific product,
such as news and web services sites. These websites have content that is already not easily
monetizable. The privacy regulation makes monetizing it even more challenging. This
suggests that stronger regulations may make it harder for ads running on general content
websites to be effective, relative to ads running on websites that are linked to specific product
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categories. In addition, we found that privacy regulation is related to reduced effectiveness of
ads that did not have interactive, audio, or visual features. Again speculatively, we suggest
that as the use of customer data by marketers online becomes increasingly regulated, ads
may become more obtrusive.
This matters in both the US and Europe. Specifically, the FTC is considering moving
to directly regulating online targeting in the US rather than relying on self-regulation, while
new EU regulations requiring opt-in consent for cookies are likely to pass into individual
countries’ laws by 2011. Measurement of the effect of privacy regulation is important because,
as highlighted in a recent complaint to the FTC,12 whether or not regulation is desirable
depends on weighing the potential harm privacy regulation would cause to advertisers against
the potential for an increase in privacy protections for customers. In describing proposed
US regulation, Congressman Rick Boucher, chair of the subcommittee on ‘Communications,
Technology and the Internet’, said that ‘Our goal is not to hinder online advertising [...]
This will make people more likely to trust electronic commerce and the internet’ (Kang,
2009). However, our results do suggest that regulation does hinder the effectiveness of online
advertising.
Broadly, our results therefore suggest that privacy regulation may affect the direction of
innovation on the advertising-supported internet. To the extent the regulation makes ads
less effective, it will limit the scope of the advertising-supported internet. To the extent
that general interest sites are particularly effective, regulation will make these sites either
less prevalent or they will switch to alternative business models. And to the extent that
unobtrusive ads are less effective, regulation implies larger, more obtrusive ads. These costs
must be weighed against the potential benefits to consumers of privacy regulation such as
a fundamental right to privacy (Rubenfeld, 1989), an aversion to sharing personal details
12Complaint, Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data Profiling Optimization, and Economic Loss to
Consumers and Privacy: Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, April 10, 2010
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with strangers (Hui and Png, 2006), and the potential for efficiency-reducing information
externalities (Hermalin and Katz, 2006). Therefore, regulation is a trade-off between the
benefits of consumer privacy and the benefits to consumers of a potentially broader, less
obtrusive advertising-supported internet.
There are limitations to this research. First, the campaigns in our sample are not random
and therefore may not be representative of all online display advertising. Second, the sample
consists of people who responded to a survey and they may be different from other internet
users. Third, our estimates reflect how firms interpreted the law rather than the effect of the
actual text of the law. There was substantial ambiguity about how much the laws curtailed
different tracking activities, so we may be picking up in our estimates a conservative legal
interpretation of the law in addition to the actual effects of the law themselves. Fourth, we
do not have data that allow us to analyze whether these changes in ad effectiveness led to
a change in revenues for the websites or changes in the prices charged for different kinds of
ads. Fifth, while we provide considerable suggestive evidence in favor of a causal relationship
from the regulations to a reduction in ad effectiveness, as in every empirical study based on
historical data we cannot completely reject the possibility that some omitted variable is
driving our results. Sixth, it is not clear whether our results generalize to websites, such as
Facebook, which explicitly offer users control over their privacy settings. It is possible, that
such proprietary opt-in advertising networks may even benefit from regulation of this kind,
if it means they are relatively more efficient.
Nevertheless, our results do suggest that online advertising in Europe became less effective
after the introduction of the Privacy Directive and that not all websites and all types of
advertising were affected equally. Consequently, any new privacy regulations will likely play
a significant role in shaping economic activity on the internet.
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